It is a known result that for a minimum cost spanning tree (mcst) game a Core allocation can be deduced directly from a mcst in the underlying network. To determine this Core allocation one only needs to determine a mcst in the network and it is not necessary to calculate the coalition values of the corresponding mcst game. In this paper we will deduce other Core allocations directly from the network, without determining the corresponding mcst game itself: we use an idea of Bird (cf. [4]) to present two procedures that determine a part of the Core (called the Irreducible Core) from the network.
Introduction
A mcst game is a cooperative cost game that arises from a cost allocation problem in a complete weighted graph. One node of this graph represents a source that can provide the other nodes (which are identified with the players) with a certain good or service. The value of a coalition in the mcst game is determined by the minimal cost to provide the members of that coalition with the good or service involved, without help from the players outside the coalition, i.e., the minimal cost to connect all players in the coalition to the source (directly or via other players in that coalition). This minimal cost is precisely the cost of a mcst in the weighted subgraph induced by the coalition involved. Mcst games were introduced by Bird [4] . Throughout this paper we will use the following notations and definitions concerning mcst games.
For n ~ I~l put N := { 1, 2, ..., n} and for S ~_ N put So := S w {0}. (KNo, w) , where KNo :=
Definition I.I: A network on N O is an ordered pair

(No, E(KNo) ~ represents the complete graph with node set N O and set of undirected edoes E* KNo):= { {i,j}[i,j ~ No, i ~ j}, and w: E(KNo)~ •+ represents a nonnegative function on E(KNo ).
allocation. This allocation can be derived directly from a mcst FNo in the underlying network as follows: each player i is charged the weight of the unique edge, incident with node i, that is on the path in FNo from node i to the common supplier 0. We will denote this so-called mcst allocation corresponding to the mcst FNo by T(FNo).
Summarizing, for mcst games a Core allocation can be determined directly from (a mcst in) the network, i.e., it is not necessary to determine the coalition values of the corresponding mcst game (using Definition 1.3) in order to determine this particular Core allocation. A lot of efforts have been made to find Core allocations, other than mcst allocations, that can also be deduced directly from the network (without first determining the mcst game itself). In case the network contains a mcst which is a chain (i.e., a spanning tree in which all nodes have degree two, except for the common supplier and one other node which have degree one), lots of additional Core allocations can be determined in this way (cf. [3] , I-1]). For an arbitrary network, however, the only known result is Granot and Huberman's (repeated) weak demand operation (cf. [9] ). This operation transforms a mcst allocation into another allocation using the idea that, if allocated according to a mcst allocation, a player i can charge his followers (in the mcst considered) some amount for using (in order to connect themselves to the common supplier) the edge that connects i to his predecessor. (According to the mcst allocation the cost of this edge is fully charged to i himself!) In I-4] another idea is presented to obtain Core allocations from the network. In 1-4] a new weight function is constructed with the aid of a fixed mcst in the network considered. The Core of the mcst game corresponding to the new network, called the Irreducible Core, is a subset of the original Core. The main goal in this paper is to show how (the extreme points of) this Irreducible Core can be deduced from the network without first having to determine the mcst game itself.
In 1-4] and 1-6] two nice characterizations for the Irreducible Core are presented: the set of extreme points of the Irreducible Core coincides with both the set of marginal allocations of the mcst game corresponding to the adapted network and the set of all mcst allocations in this adapted network. We will use these characterizations to present two procedures to determine the extreme points of the Irreducible Core from this network. The first procedure determines all marginal allocations directly from this network and the second determines all mcst allocations.
In the next section we will present an accurate definition of the notion of Irreducible Core and state the main known results. Then we use these results to describe the two procedures to determine this Irreducible Core from the adapted network. In the last section we elucidate one of these procedures with an example.
We conclude this section with some notations and state a graph theoretic theorem. The proof of this theorem can be found in [3] .
An arbitrary graph G will be denoted by the ordered pair (V(G), E(G)), where V(G) represents the node (vertex) set and E(G) the (undirected) edge set of G. If there can be no ambiguity we write V and E instead of V(G) and E(G) respec- i) F is a mcst in ( V, E, w) ii) w(e) > w(e') for all e e E\E(F) and e' e E(Pe(F) ).
The Irreducible Core
In this section we define an adaptation of the weight function in a network. This adaptation was introduced in I-4] to determine additional Core allocations for mcst games. We will mention some interesting properties of the resulting network and its corresponding mcst game. We will define the notion of Irreducible Core and present two procedures to determine the extreme points of this subset of the original Core directly from the adapted network.
Definition 2.1: Let ['No be a mcst in (KNo, w). Define the network (KNo, wr~o ) by wr~o(e) := max{w(~)[~ E E(Pe(FNo)) } for all e e E(KNo) .
For any edge e ~ E(KNo) the new weight w r~o(e) represents the largest weight of all edges that are on the path in FNo from one endpoint of e to the other. The next proposition states some elementary properties of the network (KNo, w rNo). where the inequality follows from (ii), the first equality from the fact that both FNo and F~o are mcst's in <K~o, w> and the last equality from (i). So F~o is a spanning tree in <KNo, wry~ with less total weight than the mcst FNo (cf. (iii)). Therefore F~o is also a mcst in <KNo, wry~ This implies that the inequality above must be an equality. So, by (ii), w r~o(e) = w(e) for all e e E(F~o ). This 
Proposition 2.2: i) wrNo(e) = w(e) for all e ~ E(FNo) ii) wrNo(e) < w(e) for all e ~ E(KNo ) iii) FNo is a mcst in (KNo, wCNo) iv) If F/Vo is a mcst in (KNo, w), then F~o is also a mcst in (KNo, wrNo) and wrNo(e) = wr~o(e) for all e ~ E(KNo
i) (N, ?) is a concave game, i.e.,
~(S u {i}) -~(S) _> ~(Tu {i}) -~(T) for all i~ N and all S ~_ T ~_ N\{i}
where, for any set Q _ R ~, ch(Q) denotes the convex hull of Q. Part (i), which is proved in [6] , implies that the Core of (N, E) is exactly the convex hull of all marginal allocations of (N, ~) (cf. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] ). Here the notion of a marginal allocation is defined as follows. The second method to determine the Irreducible Core doesn't consider marginal allocations but uses the result of Theorem 2.3(ii) directly. This method determines all mcst's in (KNo, ~) and deduces their mcst allocations. To apply this method one must know how to find all mcst's in (KNo, ~). First we formulate one of Kruskal's procedures (cf. [10] ) to construct a mcst in a weighted connected graph.
The following procedure generates a mcst in the weighted connected graph (V, E, w).
(2.1)
--
Choose any node v ~ V. Put S = {v} and/~ = ~.
As long as S ~ V, choose an edge {i,j} ~ E with i 6 S andj ~ V\S such that
w({i,j}) = min{w({k, l})[k ~ S, l ~ V\S, {k, l} ~ E}.
Put S:= Su {j} and/~:= Eu {{i,j}}.
This procedure constructs a mcst in (V, E, w) starting with an arbitrary node v, i.e., a one-node-tree, and extends this tree, step by step, by adding one node at the time, each time using one of the available edges of lowest weight. The next Theorem states that each mcst in a weighted connected graph is obtainable from procedure (2.1), where the starting point can be chosen arbitrarily.
Theorem 2.5: Let F= (V, E(F)) be a mcst in the weighted connected graph (V, E, w). Then F can be constructed by procedure (2.1), starting at any node v~V.
Proof: Assume the contrary. Take v ~ V such that F cannot be constructed by starting the procedure (2.1) at v. We construct F, starting at v as far as possible using procedure (2.
1). This will end up with a connected graph Fs = (S, if2) with v ~ S ~ V and/~ ~ E(F). Take {i,j} ~ E such that i ~ S,j E V\S and w({i,j}) = min{w({k, l})lk ~ S, l ~ V\S, {k, l} ~ E}. Then w({i,j}) < min{w({k, /})lk ~ S, l E V\S, {k, l} ~ E(F)} (2.2) because the procedure (2.1) terminated at stage (S,/~). Take {i*,j*} ~ E(Pii(F))
with i* e S and j* e V\S. Then w({i*,j*}) > w({i,j}) because of (2.2). But then (V, (E(F)u {{i,j}})\{{i*,j*}}) would be a spanning tree in (V, E, w) with less total weight than F. This contradiction completes the proof of the theorem.
[] Theorem 2.5 guarantees that all mcst's in a network can be determined by performing the procedure (2.1) in all possible ways (starting with a fixed chosen node). Now the extreme points of the Irreducible Core can be obtained simply by deducing from each mcst in (KNo, ~) its mcst allocation (cf. Theorem 2.3(ii)).
The two procedures described above show that several Core allocations of a mcst game other than mcst allocations can be obtained directly from the network. In the next section we will elucidate the determination of the weight function ~ and the extreme points of the Irreducible Core (using the second procedure) for a special class of mcst games.
An Example
In [5] relationships between mcst games and bankruptcy games are studied. In this context 0 < dl < d2 _< "'" _< dn denotes the sequence of claims of creditors 1, 2 ..... n respectively in a bankruptcy situation with estate E. We assume that It is a known result that bankruptcy games are convex games, i.e.,
< E < d(N) where, for S ~_ N, d(S)
:
u(S w {i}) --u(S) <_ u(T w {i}) --u(T) for alliENandallS~_T~_N\{i}
. So, by (3.1), the mcst game (N, c) corresponding to the network (KNo, w) is concave. This class of mcst games is one of the few known classes of concave mcst games. For these games (in contradistinction with arbitrary mcst games) we can easily determine the Core, because for concave cost games the Core coincides with the convex hull of the set of all marginal allocations (cf. I-12]). This and Theorem 2.3(i) encouraged us to determine the Irreducible Core of these games in order to investigate (in future research) how the Irreducible Core of a mcst game is related to its Core in case the mcst game is already concave itself. This explains why we use this particular network to elucidate the second method described in the previous section to determine the extreme points of the Irreducible Core. Before determining the network (KNo, ~) we show how to determine all mcst allocations in the network (KNo, w) itself. In this section we will focus on the case that there exists a k e {3, 4 ..... n -1} such that dk < D < dk+~ and d(K) <<_ D. So d~ < D for all i e K and d~ > D for all i ~ N\K. First note that
2D-max{O,d i+dj-D}>2D-di>D
for alli, j~K .
We divide K into classes of players with equal demands. Let dl < d2 < "'" <dt be such that {dl, 22 .... ,2,} = {d 1, d 2 ..... dk}, where t < k = IKI and let for i = 1, 2 ..... t respectively, K i := {j ~ Kld~ = 2,} denote the set of all players in K with claim equal to 2~. Note that the players in K* have consecutive numbers. Now by Theorem 2.5 and (3.3) we have that each mcst in (KNo, w) can be constructed as follows. Start with any node v ~ N\K (note that N\K ~ ~j because n ~ N\K). Then connect all other nodes in N\K in an arbitrary order, each by using an edge of weight D. This results in a spanning tree T on node set N\K. Subsequently the nodes in K t are connected with T in an arbitrary order, i.e., each node in K t is connected with some node in N\K, using an edge of weight 2D -dr. Then the nodes in K t-1 are connected with T in an arbitrary order, i.e., each node in K t-1 is connected with some node in N\K, using an edge of weight 2D -2t-~. Then the nodes in K t-2 are connected with T and so on, up to the nodes in K 1. Finally 0 is connected with an arbitrary node in N by an edge of weight 2D.
Knowing that each mcst in (KNo, w) can be constructed as indicated above, we now are able to describe all mcst allocations of (N, c). If we distinguish two cases concerning the unique neighbour j of 0 in the mcst FNo considered, we can derive the following expressions. 
~. 2D --dl
By Theorem 2.5 and 2D > 2D -d~ > D for all i e K we have that each mcst in (KNo, ~) can be constructed as follows.
Start with any node v ~ N\K. Then connect all other nodes in N\K in an arbitrary order, each by using an edge of weight D. Subsequently, connect all nodes in K t, one by one, in an arbitrary order, using an edge of weight 2D --dt (so the first node of K t (in the chosen order) is connected with some node in N\K, the others with either a node in N\K or a node in K t which is already connected).
Then connect all nodes in K", one by one, in an arbitrary order, using an edge of weight 2D -d. (so the first node of K" (in the chosen order) is connected with some node in (N\K) w K', the others with either a node in (N\K) u K t or a node in K" which is already connected). Then the nodes in W -z are connected and so on, up to the nodes in K 1. Finally 0 is connected to an arbitrary node in N by an edge of weight 2D.
Knowing the structure of the mcst's in <K~o, W>, we now can describe all mcst allocations of <N, ~>. Let again j ~ N denote the unique neighbour of 0 in the mcst F~o considered. Now the Irreducible Core can be obtained immediately from Theorem 2.3(ii). Notice that the set of mcst allocations of (N, c) is indeed a subset of the set of mcst allocations of (N, 5). In case t >_ 2 this inclusion is strict, which means that in this case several Core allocations of (N, c), other than mcst allocations of (N, c), are determined.
